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eneral discussion and future perspectives
The main aim of this thesis was to increase knowledge on the structural and functional 
neural substrates of insight in patients with a psychotic disorder. Our focus was on brain 
connectivity given that the parallelly distributed patterns of activation of brain networks 
(i.e. neural synchrony) are thought to underpin complex mental abilities. In Chapters 
2-5, we focused on clinical insight in patients with a psychotic disorder. However, 
patients might admit to being ill and needing treatment without a real understanding of 
their illness and integration of their illness in their self-concept. Therefore, in Chapters 
2 and 4-6, we additionally studied a second type of insight called cognitive insight. This 
involves individuals’ attributive metacognitive ability (i.e. awareness and understanding 
of one’s own thought processes), and directly measures distorted thinking styles. 
Learning more about brain regions underlying these (distorted) thinking styles 
increases knowledge that could be of clinical significance, as these cognitive styles 
might be targeted in treatment. In the current chapter, main findings are summarized 
and integrated, and critical considerations and future perspectives are discussed. 
7.1 Clinical insight
7.1.1 Global brain abnormalities
The meta-analyses and systematic review of the literature that are described in 
Chapter 2, suggest spatially diffuse global abnormalities across the brain in patients 
with impaired insight, given that structural and functional abnormalities of numerous 
regions across the brain were associated with poorer clinical insight. Indeed, two meta-
analyses on either voxel-based morphometry (VBM)-studies or functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI)-studies did not reveal a clear structural or functional 
substrate of clinical insight by pinpointing specific isolated brain areas. This might 
suggest that the literature is plagued by false positive findings. However, a lot of these 
regions were consistently found across studies. Moreover, on the global level, three 
meta-analyses including studies on either i) the sum of total gray and white matter 
volume, ii) total gray matter volume, or iii) total white matter volume, showed that 
patients with poorer clinical insight have both lower total gray and white matter volume. 
All in all, this suggests that methods taking the complex network of the whole brain into 
account may provide a more meaningful explanation of impaired insight in psychotic 
disorders than a focal (regional) approach. To this end, connectivity at the systems-
level was investigated in Chapter 5. 
In Chapter 5, we found converging evidence for abnormalities at the systems-level in 
poorer clinical insight in patients with a psychotic disorder. In this chapter, gray matter 
connectomes were created based on similarity of gray matter structure, and clinical 
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insight was related to several brain organization indices. We found lower clustering 
coefficient, reflective of less segregation into subnetworks and a more random brain 
topology, in patients with lower scores on one dimension of clinical insight, namely 
the ability to attribute symptoms to the illness (i.e. SAI-E Relabeling of symptoms). 
Additionally, we showed that higher betweenness centrality, indicative of an increase 
in hub characteristics, was also related to clinical insight (i.e. PANSS G12 scores). 
On a more speculative note, it has been suggested that a failure of performance of 
hub-regions (i.e. regions that are important for communication across the brain as 
they are well-connected to other regions) in schizophrenia leads to a compensatory 
reorganization with a shift and increase of hub-characteristics to brain areas that are 
less central. This could be reflected in an average increase in hub-characteristics, 
and might have global influence on complex higher-order functions underlying 
insight. A previous study indeed found reduced centrality of conventional hub-
regions (i.e. dorsolateral prefrontal, insula, anterior cingulate cortex) and emergence 
of peripheral hubs (i.e. fusiform gyrus) in schizophrenia (Palaniyappan et al., 2019). 
The study described in Chapter 5 is the first study creating gray matter connectomes 
at the individual level, allowing the investigation of the relationship between gray 
matter brain organization indices and symptoms. Altogether, our results indicate that 
system’s level gray matter brain organization indices are related to inter-individual 
differences in insight into psychosis. In this thesis, we did not investigate the relation 
between clinical insight and functional and DTI connectivity at the systems-level. 
One could expect, however, that these systems-level abnormalities would also be 
reflected in the functional and DTI connectome. Future studies could shed more 
light on this matter. 
7.1.2 Processes underlying clinical insight
Our findings in Chapter 2 and 5 support the idea that clinical insight might require 
several basic as well as higher-order cognitive functions (e.g. social-, neuro-, and 
metacognitive functions such as self-reflectiveness, perspective taking, cognitive 
flexibility and self-referential processing), that cannot be pinpointed to isolated brain 
regions as they require global brain integration. 
Good clinical insight has been suggested to require adequate integration of externally- 
and internally-generated information to integrate information from the environment 
into one’s self-representation (Ebisch and Aleman, 2016). This is consistent with the 
model as described by Lysaker et al. (Lysaker et al., 2018). Lysaker and colleagues 
suggest that good insight requires the ability to construct and continuously update a 
currently correct account of one’s own state while integrating information on internal 
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that these abilities might be affected by basic biological processes or structures, 
impaired perspective taking and sense of self as well as by one’s own experiences 
and more general socio-political factors.
Cognitive neuroscience models that attempt to explain impaired insight also stress 
the necessity of intact metacognitive and sensory abilities (e.g. self-evaluation and 
reflection) for good insight (Flashman and Roth, 2004). In order to have good clinical 
insight, one should be able to create an accurate meta-representation of oneself which 
requires adequate metacognitive abilities (Bergé et al., 2011). Altogether, our findings 
indeed suggest that complex processes, that require global brain integration, underlie 
insight.
7.1.3 Local abnormalities and processes underlying clinical insight
Current treatment options have limited success in the improvement of insight 
(Pijnenborg et al., 2013b). Studies that shed light on specific brain regions that are 
involved in insight are important for treatment development, as they may yield clues 
about underlying functional processes, whereas information at the most macroscopic 
level might not be helpful. Moreover, global abnormalities might be driven by local 
abnormalities. In Chapter 5, no significant associations were found between poorer 
insight and local gray matter network properties. Therefore, in Chapters 2-4, we studied 
the relationship between insight and local white matter and functional connectivity.
The systematic review in Chapter 2 showed that the inferior frontal gyrus/ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex was most consistently implicated in clinical insight in studies 
examining brain structure as well as brain activation. The inferior frontal gyrus has 
been implicated in the inhibition of one’s own perspective (Van der Meer et al., 2011), 
while the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex has been suggested to play a role in cognitive 
control and selective attention for salient stimuli (Wearne, 2018). The ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex has been shown to coactivate with other regions within the salience 
network (e.g. insula) and the central executive network (e.g. dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex) (Wearne, 2018). Two meta-analyses, described in Chapter 2, that integrated 
studies conducted on left or right frontal gyrus volume revealed significant positive 
relationships with insight. As these studies pointed towards an important role of 
the frontal gyri in poorer insight, we aimed to investigate frontal white matter and 
functional connectivity in Chapters 3 and 4.
In Chapter 3, we investigated how clinical insight relates to abnormalities in local 
white matter as measured with Proton Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy (1H-MRS). 
We found that there were lower N-acetylaspartate (NAA) concentrations in the white 
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matter of the left (dorsolateral) prefrontal cortex of patients with lower insight (as 
measured with the Birchwood Insight Scale (BIS)). This correlation was driven by the 
awareness of illness dimension. Reduced NAA concentrations are thought to indicate 
reduced neuronal integrity which might be caused by impaired functioning of axons 
causing abnormal neural connectivity (Du et al., 2013; Tang et al., 2007). Thus, findings 
in this chapter pointed towards local white matter prefrontal dysconnectivity in patients 
with impaired clinical insight.
These findings are in line with several previous studies that showed volumetric (Shad 
et al., 2006b, 2006a, 2004), as well as functional- and DTI connectivity abnormalities 
of the prefrontal cortex in patients with poorer clinical insight (Ćurčić-Blake et al., 2015; 
Liemburg et al., 2012). This might be explained by the role of the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex in executive functions such as the abilities to monitor and evaluate one’s own 
behavior and to adjust one’s own thoughts and beliefs to changing situations (Shad 
et al., 2007, 2006b) as well as metacognitive functions such as the abilities to make 
complex representation of oneself and others, to reflect upon oneself and to take the 
perspective of others. Altogether, in this study we confirm and extend results of prior 
studies that implicated prefrontal white matter abnormalities in poorer clinical insight 
by showing that these abnormalities are also reflected in NAA-concentrations. 
In Chapter 4, we aimed to study how local functional connectivity abnormalities relate 
to clinical insight. An fMRI emotion regulation task was used to probe an emotion 
regulation network including prefrontal areas given that (1) the prefrontal cortex plays 
a critical role in emotion generation and regulation (Dixon et al., 2017), (2) numerous 
studies have shown emotional dysregulation in schizophrenia (Henry et al., 2007; 
Horan et al., 2013; Morris et al., 2012; Perry et al., 2012; Van der Meer et al., 2014), 
and (3) good insight might require intact emotion regulation abilities to deal with the 
negative emotions accompanying awareness of illness. Therefore, we investigated 
how clinical insight relates to activation and connectivity during emotion regulation. 
Connectivity was measured with generalized psychophysiological interactions (gPPI) 
yielding information on task-dependent connectivity. We found lower activation of 
areas involved in cognitive-emotional control (i.e. left striatum, thalamus and insula, 
right insula and caudate, and right pre- and postcentral gyrus) and visual processing of 
negative stimuli (i.e. left superior occipital gyrus and cuneus, and the right middle and 
superior occipital gyrus and cuneus) in patients with a lower ability to relabel symptoms 
(i.e. SAI-E Relabeling of symptoms). Additionally, we found higher connectivity between 
the midline medial frontal gyrus, an important area for execution of emotion regulation 
(Kohn et al., 2014; Vanderhasselt et al., 2013), and the right middle occipital gyrus in 
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A previous study found lower connectivity between the right posterior insula and pre- 
and postcentral gyri in schizophrenia patients with lower insight (i.e. PANSS G12 scores) 
(Chen et al., 2016). The authors suggested that decreased connectivity between the 
insula and sensorimotor areas (i.e. pre-and post-central gyrus and occipital areas) 
in patients with impaired insight might be explained by abnormal integration of 
somatosensory and visual signals, leading to abnormalities in self-other distinction 
(Chen et al., 2016). The ability to discriminate oneself from others is essential for 
insight. The systematic review in Chapter 2 also revealed that insular (in addition to 
inferior frontal) abnormalities were found most frequently in fMRI-activation studies. 
Various studies implicated the importance of the insula in insight (Palaniyappan et 
al., 2011; Sapara et al., 2015; Shad and Keshavan, 2015; van der Meer et al., 2013) 
and stressed its role in self-monitoring (Sapara et al., 2015) and other introspective 
processes (Palaniyappan et al., 2011). The insula has been shown to be involved in 
“being in touch with oneself” in a quite literal way as it is involved in the representation 
of awareness of bodily states (Damasio, 1999). The insula also plays an important role 
in the Salience Network, mediating the switch between interoceptive and exteroceptive 
attention (Menon and Uddin, 2010). Abnormalities of the salience network have been 
previously implicated in poorer clinical insight (Gerretsen et al., 2014). Our findings 
in Chapter 3 could be explained such as that individuals with poorer ability to relabel 
symptoms might direct their attention less inward to monitor their expressions (Hayes 
et al., 2010; Richards and Gross, 2000). This explanation could be in line with the denial 
model, which suggests that poor insight is caused by the use of denial as a coping 
strategy in order to reduce distress caused by stigma associated with diagnosis of 
schizophrenia (Cooke et al., 2005). However, more objective evidence for the denial 
model is needed. An alternative explanation could be that somatosensory and visual 
signals are abnormally integrated in patients with poorer ability to relabel symptoms, 
giving rise to problems in self-other distinction and insight.
In Chapter 4, we additionally found less activation of areas involved in visual processing 
of negative stimuli, which could indicate attentional shifts and an implicit reduction 
in processing of emotion-evoking aspects of negative stimuli during expressive 
suppression. This might be explained by the decoupling hypothesis that suggests that 
when the mind wanders, attention decouples from perception (Schooler et al., 2011; 
Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). Attention might thus be relocated to task-unrelated 
thoughts resulting in superficial processing of perceptual information. This implicates 
important roles for the DMN, salience or attention networks, as well as networks 
involved in processing of perceptual information in impaired insight. The systematic 
review in Chapter 2 indeed revealed that fMRI-connectivity studies most frequently 
implicated the Default Mode Network. The DMN consists of medial and lateral parietal, 
194
medial prefrontal, and medial and lateral temporal brain areas (Raichle, 2015). The 
function of the DMN is less well-understood but it has been suggested to be involved 
in introspective cognitive functions including mind-wandering (Christoff et al., 2009; 
Mason et al., 2007). 
Summarized, abnormalities in the interplay between networks such as the DMN, 
attention networks and (somatosensory) perception networks might interrupt 
processes necessary for good insight, such as switching between interoceptive and 
exteroceptive attention and integrating external information into one’s self-concept. An 













































































7.1.4 Distinct processes underlying different dimensions of insight
An important question is which brain regions and connectivity patterns underlie the 
distinct dimensions of clinical insight. At the global (i.e. whole brain) level, our findings in 
Chapter 5 demonstrate that relabeling of symptoms is associated with lower segregation 
of gray matter connectomes. No significant associations were found between global 
brain organization indices and other clinical insight dimensions. Compared to the other 
dimensions of clinical insight, relabeling of symptoms appears to be of higher-order 
as it not only requires illness awareness but also the ability to integrate self-related 
information with information concerning the social and cultural environment while 
actively processing ongoing information from oneself as well as others. These processes 
might represent an interplay of more dynamic and higher-order processing which might 
be more severely affected by disturbances at the systems-level rather than regional 
abnormalities. Additionally, lower clustering coefficient suggests less segregated 
specialized processing of information, which might affect higher-order processes (such 
as relabeling of symptoms) more than basic processes. 
Locally, awareness of illness was found to be related to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
abnormalities. This is in line with a study of Shad and colleagues that suggested that 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex abnormalities may underlie impaired awareness of illness 
by interfering with self-monitoring (Shad et al., 2006a). In the empirical chapters, no 
relationships were found with the Need for treatment dimension. This is line with earlier 
studies, that rarely found significant associations between this dimension and brain 
structure (i.e. only two studies) (Buchy et al., 2011; Sapara et al., 2007). Recognizing 
the need for treatment might be associated more with environmental and personal 
factors such as stigma sensitivity, support from family and friends, and culture. One 
study, for example, showed that insight into the need for treatment was influenced 
by frequency of interactions between the patient and their parent (Macgregor et al., 
2015). The systematic review and meta-analyses in Chapter 2 did not reveal different 
local neural correlates underlying distinct insight dimensions, however, given that 
regions were usually involved in more than one dimension of insight. A few regions 
were only associated with one dimension of insight, but this was not consistently found 
across multiple (i.e. >1) studies. Altogether, it remains unclear whether clinical insight 
dimensions depend on different brain regions, but global integration deficiencies likely 
underlie complex insight dimensions such as relabeling of symptoms.
7.1.5 Proposed model to explain poor clinical insight
Based on the results in this thesis, we propose a new model of brain areas and 
processes underlying poor clinical insight. We suggest that awareness of symptoms 
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functions such as the abilities to monitor and evaluate one’s own behavior and to adjust 
one’s own thoughts and beliefs to changing situations (Shad et al., 2007, 2006b). 
Relabeling of symptoms requires complex cognitive functions (e.g. social-, neuro-, 
and metacognitive functions such as self-reflectiveness, perspective taking, cognitive 
flexibility and self-referential processing), that cannot be pinpointed to isolated brain 
regions as they require global brain integration. We hypothesize that need for treatment 
cannot be pinpointed to neural abnormalities, but that it might be associated more with 
environmental and personal factors.
7.2 Cognitive insight
The construct of clinical insight is complex and our findings suggest that abnormalities 
across the brain give rise to difficulties in several complex processes that are 
necessary for having good insight. These findings raise the question whether directly 
measuring patients’ attributive metacognitive ability or cognitive style might yield more 
clinically relevant information. After all, these cognitive styles can be directly targeted 
in treatment. Therefore, in this thesis, we also extensively studied the neural correlates 
of cognitive insight.
7.2.1 Brain abnormalities underlying poor cognitive insight 
In Chapter 2, a systematic review of the literature revealed that structural neuroimaging 
studies most often found hippocampal involvement, while fMRI-studies most often found 
involvement of the inferior frontal gyrus/ventrolateral prefrontal cortex in cognitive insight 
in patients with a psychotic disorder. It should be noted, however, that studies that found 
hippocampal involvement were all ROI-studies that specifically focused on that region. Our 
findings in Chapter 4, were not in line with other literature, as we showed lower activation 
of brain systems subserving control and execution of emotion regulation (i.e. left and right 
pre- and postcentral gyrus and the left middle cingulate gyrus) in patients with lower self-
reflectiveness. A speculative explanation of our results could be that that patients with 
lower self-reflectiveness (i.e. lower cognitive insight) are less involved in emotion regulation 
because of an implicit reduction of processing of emotion-evoking aspects of negative 
stimuli. This might be in line with the denial model, which suggests that poor insight is 
caused by the use of denial as a coping strategy in order to reduce distress caused by 
stigma associated with diagnosis of schizophrenia (Cooke et al., 2005). 
Our findings of lower path length, clustering coefficient and small-world coefficients 
of gray matter connectomes in patients with poorer cognitive insight, as described in 
Chapter 5, show support of disturbances at the systems-level. Lower clustering and 
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small-world coefficients suggest a global imbalance between functional integration 
and segregation which may lead to dysfunction (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010). The 
association with general cognitive insight appeared to be driven by the self-certainty 
dimension, while no significant associations were found for the self-reflectiveness 
dimension. Additionally, locally, we found lower clustering and small-world coefficient 
of the left inferior occipital gyrus in patients with lower cognitive insight suggesting 
that this region might drive system-level abnormalities. 
As we established local as well as systems-level abnormalities in poorer cognitive 
insight in patients in Chapters 4 and 5, we aimed to get a more comprehensive 
view of the neural substrate of cognitive insight by combining data from different 
MRI-modalities in Chapter 6. This chapter only included data of healthy individuals 
as cognitive insight reflects general cognitive styles that do not necessarily pertain 
illness. We hypothesized that cognitive insight is a dynamic process and therefore 
related it to temporal dynamics of resting state functional connectivity. Additionally, 
we related cognitive insight to characterizations of structural (i.e. DTI and gray matter 
structure) networks. Our findings in Chapter 6 suggest less stable functional and 
structural networks in individuals with poorer cognitive insight, and specifically poorer 
self-reflectiveness, with an overly present DMN. That is based on our findings that 
individuals with lower cognitive insight switched more between states, and spent less 
time in a globally synchronized state. An explanation for our results that individuals 
with lower cognitive insight spend less time in the globally synchronized baseline state, 
could be that in these individuals the transition towards specialized networks is more 
difficult, rendering more frequent switching between states and less stable functional 
networks. With regard to the self-reflectiveness dimension, individuals with lower self-
reflectiveness also switched more between states and spent less time in a globally 
synchronized state (at trend-level significance). Additionally, they spent more time in, 
had a higher probability of, and had a higher chance of switching to a state entailing 
Default Mode Network (DMN) areas. Thus, an overly present DMN appears to play a 
key role in poorer self-reflectiveness. The DMN has been suggested to be involved in 
introspective cognitive functions including mind-wandering (Christoff et al., 2009; 
Mason et al., 2007). With lower self-reflectiveness, DTI-connectomes were segregated 
less (i.e. lower clustering coefficient), and there was a higher connectedness of the 
left angular gyrus (i.e. lower path length). The left angular gyrus has shown to be a 
key region in the DMN (Greicius et al., 2003; Raichle et al., 2001; Uddin et al., 2009). 
Lower clustering coefficients of DTI-connectomes were significantly related to higher 
switching frequency and a higher probability of occurrence of the state similar to 
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to be related to less stable functional networks and spending more time in the DMN. 
Altogether, our results suggest that individuals with lower self-reflectiveness show 
structural over-connectedness of the angular gyrus, a key region of the DMN, and that 
this is associated with an overly present DMN. Summarized, findings in this chapter 
implicate less stable functional and structural networks, as well as an important role of 
the DMN in poorer cognitive insight. An overview of all results with regard to cognitive 
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7.2.2 Processes underlying cognitive insight
Findings in patients with a psychotic disorder show that system-level abnormalities in 
gray matter connectomes are related to cognitive insight, and self-certainty specifically. 
Locally, findings in this thesis implicated gray matter network abnormalities of the left 
inferior occipital gyrus in lower cognitive insight, and lower activation in the pre- and 
postcentral gyrus, and left middle cingulate gyrus in lower self-reflectiveness. These 
areas have not been implicated in cognitive insight in previous studies, however. The 
review of the literature in Chapter 2 implicated the inferior frontal gyrus/ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex and hippocampus most frequently in poorer cognitive insight. 
The ventrolateral prefrontal cortex has been linked to self-reflection, cognitive control 
of memory (Badre and Wagner, 2007; Levy and Wagner, 2011) and working memory 
(Buchy et al., 2015; Wolf et al., 2006). These memory processes have been linked to 
the ability to hold information online and are hypothesized to play a role in the ability to 
consider alternative hypotheses about one’s own (possibly incorrect) beliefs (Orfei et 
al., 2013). The hippocampus was also found to play a role in self-related processes in 
previous studies (Schmitz and Johnson, 2006), forming a network with the dorsomedial 
and -lateral prefrontal cortex that facilitates cognitive control and monitoring of self-
related decisions. The hippocampus also plays a role in several memory processes 
(Sheldon and Levine, 2018) that have been associated with cognitive insight (Davies et 
al., 2017), in particular declarative memory. Thus, results suggest that cognitive insight 
mainly relies on the ability to retrieve and integrate self-related information.
In healthy individuals, our results show converging evidence of less stable functional 
and structural networks in individuals with poorer cognitive insight, or self-
reflectiveness specifically, with a key role of the DMN. Individuals with lower cognitive 
insight spend less time in the globally synchronized baseline state which may make 
the transition towards specialized networks more difficult, rendering more frequent 
switching between states, less stable functional networks and an overly present 
DMN. Less stable functional networks and an overly present DMN were related to 
less anatomical segregation of the DTI connectome into subnetworks. Additionally, 
an overly connected left angular gyrus within the DTI connectome was also related to 
an overly present DMN.
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7.3 Critical considerations and future perspectives
Several factors complicate the investigation of the neural substrate of insight. At this 
point, some of these factors will be shortly discussed whereas other factors will be 
discussed in more detail in subsections below. First, all studies were cross-sectional. 
Therefore, no conclusions on causality can be drawn. Future studies of longitudinal 
design, that preferably also include individuals at ultra-high risk for psychosis, could 
provide more information on how insight relates to brain connectivity over time and 
how that relates to cognitive models of insight. Additionally, it is unclear whether we 
completely capture the concept of insight with cross-sectional investigations as it is not 
a fully static construct. Insight appears to have trait- as well as state-like properties, given 
that it is associated with cognitive deficits, brain structural abnormalities and education, 
but also with symptom severity and it improves with antipsychotic treatment (Wiffen et 
al., 2010). Longitudinal studies, for example using experience sampling methodology, 
could shed more light on this matter. Second, samples were heterogeneous with 
regard to illness duration, symptomatology, illness severity, use of antipsychotics and 
substance (ab-)use. These factors have differential effects on insight. For example, a 
meta-analysis showed that clinical insight improves after treatment with antipsychotics, 
but only in the early phase of the disorder (Pijnenborg et al., 2015). However, samples 
in this thesis were very similar to the general patient population making our results 
more generalizable. Future studies could, for example, follow individuals at ultra-high 
risk or drug-naïve individuals with first-episode psychosis longitudinally. A clinically 
homogenous sample could provide information that is not confounded by illness duration 
nor antipsychotic use. Third, insight is currently viewed in a linear manner, i.e. low insight 
is pathological while high insight is good. Contradictory findings in the literature show 
that impaired insight on the one hand may be associated with negative factors such as 
poorer prognosis and increased symptomatology, while on the other hand it has also 
been associated with lower depressive symptoms and higher quality of life (Wiffen et 
al., 2010). This could be explained when viewing symptoms with a non-linear inverted 
U-shape curve, as suggested by Northoff & Tumati (Northoff and Tumati, 2019). They 
argued that pathology is reflected by either too low or too high scores on a symptom 
scale, while average scores reflect healthy functioning. The same line of reasoning might 
be applicable to insight. Last, impaired insight is not unique for psychosis but is also seen 
in other neurological and psychiatric illnesses such as dementias, substance-related 
disorders, and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Dam, 2006; Goldstein et al., 2009; 
Mangone et al., 1991; Matsunaga et al., 2002). It is unclear whether the neural substrate 
of impaired insight is similar across these disorders. Studies examining insight across 
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7.3.1 Measurements of insight
Most frequently used measures of insight are the Schedule for the Assessment of 
Insight – Expanded (SAI-E), item 12 of the general psychopathology subscale of the 
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS item G12) and the Scale to Assess 
Unawareness in Mental Disorder (SUMD) (Kay et al., 1987; Shad et al., 2006b). There 
is consensus in the field that insight is a multidimensional construct, and most 
insight measures therefore consist of several subscales or aim to capture several 
subdimensions within one score. Studies often report scores on these subdimensions 
as well as total scores. In this thesis, clinical insight was measured with the PANSS 
G12 item (Chapters 3 and 5), the Birchwood Insight Scale (BIS) (Chapter 3) and the 
SAI-E (Chapters 4 and 5). These instruments have all shown to be reliable and valid 
measures of insight. 
The PANSS G12 item is a single-item measure but it aims to capture multiple 
dimensions of clinical insight. Correlations with other measures of clinical insight, 
such as the SAI, SAI-E and BIS have shown to be strong (Sanz et al., 1998). In this 
thesis, the PANSS G12 item was strongly correlated (in the expected direction) with 
other insight measures, such as the BIS total score (r=−0.6, p<0.001, n=81; Chapter 3), 
SAI-E awareness of illness (rs=-0.61, p<0.001, n=62), SAI-E Relabeling of symptoms 
(rs=-0.62, p<0.001, n=62), SAI-E Need for treatment (rs=-0.47, p<0.001, n=62) and the 
SAI-E subtotal score (rs=-0.69, p<0.001, n=62) (Chapter 5). The PANSS is a rating 
scale for assessing positive, negative and general psychopathology symptoms in 
schizophrenia. Item G12 measures lack of judgment and insight. It is scored by a 
trained interviewer (1=no impairment; 7=severe impairment). Examples of questions 
used to answer this item are ‘Do you need treatment?’ and ‘Why are you in this mental 
institution?’. A disadvantage of this measure, is that it does not measure distinct 
dimensions separately, so potential associations between one insight dimension 
and neural correlates might be obscured by non-existing associations between the 
other dimensions and neural correlates. Therefore, we additionally measured insight 
with multi-dimensional measures.
The BIS (Chapter 3) is an 8-item self-rating questionnaire with a total score ranging 
from 0 to 12. It consists of three subscales measuring three dimensions of clinical 
insight, namely awareness of illness, ability to relabel symptoms and awareness of 
need for treatment. Advantages of this questionnaire are that it is a brief, easy-to-
administer measure that can easily be incorporated as an additional measure in 
clinical trials and studies that do not focus on insight specifically. The accuracy of 
self-report measures has been questioned in schizophrenia, however, as it might 
be argued that individuals with poor insight require insight to report about their 
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own insight. Yet, clinician- or researcher-rated measures might be more biased and 
influenced by patients’ cognitive and communicative abilities. Therefore, the BIS was 
administered in Chapter 3, in addition to a researcher-rated measure of insight (i.e. 
the PANSS G12).
The last insight measure used in this thesis, is the SAI-E (Chapter 4 and 5). This is 
a semi-structured interview consisting of three subscales: (1) awareness of illness, 
(2) relabeling of symptoms to the illness, and (3) need for treatment. It comes with 
several advantages. First, no medical jargon or labels are used but questions about 
the disorder are adjusted to the patients’ own words and descriptions. Second, some 
of the items are rated by a trained interviewer (items 1-9), while some are rated by 
the patient’s clinician (A-C). Disadvantages of this insight measure, compared to the 
SUMD, are that it does not measure insight in social consequences of the disorder, 
and that it does not distinguish between current and retrospective awareness and 
attribution. The SUMD consists of 74 items, among which six general items and four 
subscales each consisting of 17 items. The general items measure current and past 
awareness of mental disorder, awareness of medication effects, and awareness of 
social consequences of the disorder. With the subscales, current awareness and 
attribution, as well as retrospective awareness and attribution with regard to specific 
symptoms, such as anhedonia and flat affect, can be measured. An important 
disadvantage of this scale is its length, rendering it not always practically possible to 
include this questionnaire in studies. Moreover, it is thorough but also complex, making 
it difficult to administer in participants with cognitive slowing or cognitive abnormalities, 
which are common symptoms in schizophrenia. The scale can be shortened in different 
ways, rendering different variations of the scale. An option would be to only rate the 
general items, but this would render it less detailed compared to the SAI-E and BIS, 
for example. Thus, given the lengthiness and complexity of the SUMD, we chose to use 
other commonly used insight measures in this thesis.
In this thesis, cognitive insight was measured with the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale 
(BCIS) (Chapters 4-7). This is a 15-item self-report questionnaire that measures (1) 
self-reflectiveness, and (2) self-certainty (Beck and Warman, 2004). Advantages 
of this scale are that (1) it can be used in nonclinical as well as in different clinical 
populations allowing comparisons the spectrum of healthy individuals and disorders, 
and (2) self-report questionnaires in general avoid researcher/clinician-bias (Marks 
et al., 2000). Disadvantages are, first, that it has been argued that a reliable report 
on one’s insight requires good insight. However, the initial validation study showed 
significant correlations between the BCIS composite index score and being aware 
of a mental disorder as measured with the SUMD (Amador et al., 1993), between the 
self-reflectiveness subscale scores and being aware of delusions as measured with 
the SUMD, and between change in BCIS-scores and change in positive and negative 
symptoms (Beck et al., 2004). In this thesis, we also found significant correlations 
between SAI-E subtotal scores and BCIS self-certainty scores (r=-0.55; p=0.002; 
n=30, Chapter 4), between SAI-E Awareness of illness subscale scores and BCIS self-
certainty subscale scores (r=-0.62; pFDR<0.001, n=30, Chapter 4), SAI-E Awareness of 
illness and BCIS self-certainty (rs=-0.25, p=0.047, n=62; Chapter 5), SAI-E Need for 
treatment and BCIS self-certainty (rs= -0.30, p=0.018, n=62; Chapter 5), and PANSS G12 
and BCIS composite index scores (rs=-0.33, p=0.008, n=62; Chapter 5). Several other 
studies from other groups have also shown reliability and validity of the BCIS and that 
it can distinguish patients with psychosis from patients without psychosis and healthy 
individuals (Riggs et al., 2012). Additionally, several studies showed increased self-
certainty (i.e. poorer cognitive insight) in individuals with at-risk mental state (Uchida 
et al., 2014) or at clinical high risk for psychosis (Kimhy et al., 2014). Thus, results of 
previous studies suggest that individuals can reliably rate their experiences (Riggs 
et al., 2012). A second disadvantage of the BCIS is that it is unclear whether general 
thoughts patterns, as measured with the BCIS, are similar to thought patterns related 
to an illness. Patients with schizophrenia, for example, might show aberrant thought 
patterns related to their illness but not related to general topics. A last disadvantage 
of insight measures in general, is that there is no measure of real behavior. Ideally, 
insight measures would not only include researcher-, clinician- and self-rated parts but 
also an objective measure of behavior. However, such a lengthy and complex insight 
measure might have low feasibility. 
7.3.2 Multicausal integrated explanations of impaired insight
Multicausal integrated explanations of impaired insight appear more likely than 
monocausal explanations given the small to modest effect sizes (of associations 
between insight and these factors) that are found and the variation between 
patients. A more holistic approach, in which information from different levels is 
integrated, would be useful to shed more light on explanations of interindividual 
variability in insight. One example of such an approach is a multiscale neuroscience 
approach in which data at different scales (i.e., genetic, molecular, cellular and 
macroscale structural and functional connectivity) is integrated to better relate 
brain structure, function and behavior (van den Heuvel et al., 2019). Another 
example of such an approach is the levels of explanation approach suggested 
by Hugdahl & Sommer (Hugdahl and Sommer, 2018). In this model, insight as a 
symptom is viewed in a vertical manner, in order to integrate and explain insight 
across different levels. Insight appears to be caused by a complex interaction of 
factors from these different levels (i.e. impairments in cognition, brain structure/
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function, stigma, symptoms etc.). Integration of information of the brain imaging 
level with information from the cultural (i.e. norms, beliefs and attitudes; e.g. stigma), 
clinical (i.e. diagnoses, symptoms, personality), cognitive (i.e. cognition, executive 
functions, meta-awareness, emotion regulation) and cellular levels (i.e. synapses 
and neurotransmitters; e.g. NAA, glutamate) might give a more comprehensive view 
of the etiology of impaired insight. Either way, it is necessary that neurobiological, 
psychological and cultural/social findings are better integrated to get a clearer 
picture of the etiology of insight.
7.4 Clinical implications
Given the multidimensionality and complexity of the insight construct, as well as various 
cognitive functions and brain areas that might underlie it, a single treatment approach 
is unlikely to be successful (Osatuke et al., 2008). Indeed, current treatment options 
have limited success in improvement of insight (Pijnenborg et al., 2013b). Clinical trials 
that specifically focused on the improvement of insight showed improved insight but 
still left it unclear which components of these treatments led to the improvement (Guo 
et al., 2010; Lalova et al., 2013; Pijnenborg et al., 2019). Thus, the identification of brain 
mechanisms underlying impaired insight is a first step towards the development of 
more effective treatment options to enhance impaired insight so that prognosis can 
be improved.
Interventions aiming to improve insight should address multiple dimensions of insight 
through a combination of neurocognitive, metacognitive and social cognitive as well 
as psychosocial approaches. Given our results of global brain integration underlying 
complex insight dimensions, the integration of new information into one’s self-concept 
could be an important part of treatment. This is consistent with the suggestion of 
Lysaker et al. that patients with schizophrenia should be helped in the integration 
of complex and negative experiences into their adapted self-concept (Lysaker et al., 
2018).
Additionally, findings in Chapter 5 show that functional and structural networks of 
healthy individuals with lower cognitive insight, and more specifically poorer self-
reflectiveness, are less stable. If these results are replicated in patients, our findings 
could have practical implications as it could inform interventions that reinforce 
functional networks, such as neurofeedback. Additionally, mind-wandering could 
be reduced through mindfulness meditation training as that might improve focus 





eneral discussion and future perspectives
Mrazek et al., 2013; Zanesco et al., 2016). Such approaches, thus, might increase 
stability of task-specific networks, decrease time spend in the DMN and ultimately 
improve the self-reflection abilities of individuals with low levels of such abilities. 
Previous studies already showed improvements of insight after mindfulness-based 
interventions (Chien and Thompson, 2014; Wang et al., 2016; Yılmaz and Okanlı, 
2018). 
7.5 Conclusions
Findings in this thesis show converging evidence that impairments in clinical and 
cognitive insight are associated with structural and functional abnormalities in the brain. 
Impairments in one dimension of clinical insight, namely awareness of illness, appear 
to be associated with abnormalities of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This might 
be explained by the role of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in executive functions 
(i.e. the abilities to monitor and evaluate one’s own behavior and to adjust one’s own 
thoughts and beliefs to changing situations) as well as metacognitive functions (i.e. the 
abilities to make complex representation of oneself and others, to reflect upon oneself 
and to take the perspective of others). Impairments in global brain integration appear 
to underlie another dimension of clinical insight, namely poorer ability to attribute 
symptoms to the illness, suggesting that this dimension of clinical insight requires 
an interplay of complex functions. The Default Mode Network, and networks involved 
in attention and perception might play an important role in this dimension of clinical 
insight. Cognitive insight in patients with a psychotic disorder appears to mainly rely 
on the underlying functions of the hippocampus and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex to 
retrieve and integrate self-related information. Lastly, our findings implicate less stable 
functional and structural networks in healthy individuals with lower cognitive insight 
with a key role of the Default Mode Network, which has been shown to be involved in 
mind wandering.

